Summarized in Dictionary of Old Testament: Wisdom, Poetry, and Writings:
The Scene in Heaven.
The scene in heaven serves a number of important functions in setting up the issues in the book. The first point that it makes clearly is that Job is indeed innocent of wrongdoing (Greenberg 1995b, 328; contra Brenner). This immediately eliminates the usual answers offered in the ancient Near East, which contended either that there really was an offense that the sufferer was unaware of or that God is simply inscrutable. This cleans the slate of tradition to make room for new explanations. A second point is that by acclaiming Job’s *righteousness from the beginning, it is made clear that Job is not on trial. This feature allows the book to focus on God’s policy regarding how the righteous are treated. Notice that in the process the book thus tackles the more difficult side of the retribution equation; that is, it is much easier to discuss why the wicked prosper. Finally, the scene in heaven shows that despite the instrumentation of the adversary, God both initiated the discussion and approved the course of action (cf. Job 42:11; see Weiss, 37). This again avoids the easy solution that insulates God by inserting an independently wicked intermediary power. The book would be toothless without this introduction. It would be reduced to philosophical speculation unable to rise above its contemporaries.
2.2. The Role of the Adversary.
Christian readers readily identify the adversary as a known character whose profile is provided by the NT . But we cannot be so hasty. “Satan” here is a function, not a personal name (see Satan). This is particularly important here, for this śāṭān is portrayed neither as an independently volitional being nor as diabolical. He is among the “sons of God,” the members of the heavenly council (see Divine Council), and he operates only as a subordinate. By permitting this adversary’s course of action, God is allowing Job’s case to stand as a test case for his policies. One can hardly label this adversary as an embodiment of evil when he simply expresses doubt concerning God’s policies, a doubt that God has prompted through his observations concerning Job (Ragaz, in Glatzer, 129).
The role of the adversary is to provide the most important twist in the challenge against God’s policies. Any human can contend that it is not a good policy for God to allow righteous people to suffer. This, of course, is Job’s challenge. What is an innovation to this discussion is the contention of the adversary that it is not a good policy for God to bring prosperity to righteous people. When the adversary asks the rhetorical question of whether Job serves God for nothing, he in effect questions whether there is such a thing as disinterested righteousness. If righteousness is routinely rewarded, will not people behave righteously just to get the reward? And if that is so, is there really such a thing as true righteousness? Does not the policy of rewarding the righteous actually inhibit true righteousness by turning presumed and even potentially righteous people into ethical mercenaries? One could only answer such questions by taking away the prosperity of someone presumed righteous—the more righteous, the surer the test. The challenge then targets a policy (attributed to God) that is formulated as a principle of retribution: the righteous will prosper and the wicked will suffer. In this way the adversary provides one side of the challenge to God’s policy (it is counterproductive for God to prosper righteous people), while Job provides the other side (it is unjust for God to allow righteous people to suffer).
2.3. The Role of Three Friends. All four friends serve as archetypes for the traditional thinking current in the ancient Near East, but Elihu is separated from the other three for a reason. Together, the three main friends function as archetypes that represent the revered wisdom of the ancient Near East at large. In contrast, we would propose that Elihu, with his Hebrew name, serves as an archetype for the contemporary, more recent (therefore, younger) thinking that was current in Israel.
The three friends, like Job himself, believe that Job is on trial, and so they promote the standard perspective and solutions that were the hallmarks of ancient wisdom (contra Albertz [245–46], who see the friends as representing Israelite traditional thinking, but supported in general by Gruber [92], who sees the friends as representative of human or Gentile wisdom, and stated outright by Mattingly [333]). Consider this ancient catalogue of symptoms and the assessment offered (for text information and bibliography, see Abusch, 85):
If a man has experienced something untoward and he does not know how it happened to him, he has continually suffered losses: losses of barley and silver, losses of male and female slaves, cattle, horses, and sheep; dogs, pigs and servants dying off altogether; he has heart-break time and again; he constantly gives orders, but no one complies, calls but no one answers; the curse of numerous people; when lying in his bed he is repeatedly apprehensive, he contracts paresis, he is filled with anger against god and king until his epileptic fit, his limbs are hanging down, from time to time he is apprehensive, he does not sleep day or night, he often sees terrifying dreams, he often gets paresis, his appetite for bread and beer is diminished, he forgets the word he spoke: that man has the wrath of the god and/or the goddess on him; his god and his goddess are angry with him.
In the ancient world different courses of action could serve as standard procedure for someone in Job’s plight. One method entailed discovery divination to try to gain information concerning either the nature of the offense or, more often, what the deity wanted. A second approach involved incantations to exorcise the source of the evil. One corpus of literature that illustrates such incantations is found in the apotropaic rituals labeled namburbi. Third, appeasement could be sought by means of exhaustive lists of offenses to which one confesses, such as those found in the šurpu rituals. The latter is most evident in the approach recommended by Job’s friends. It was unimportant in this procedure whether Job had actually committed the crimes or whether he was aware of any offenses. Though Eliphaz offers a catalog of Job’s sins (Job 22:5–9), it is only hypothetical and suggestive. The friends have no knowledge of any specific offenses of which they can accuse Job. Yet, in accordance with the demands of the retribution principle, they are convinced that he is guilty, and it is on that basis that they urge his response to God. Specifically, they advise him in the first round in general terms to make his plea before God (Job 5:8; 8:5) and put away sin (Job 11:13). They offer no advice in the second round. In the third round Eliphaz makes a lengthy plea for Job to submit to God and return to him (Job 22:21–30). A most telling element is that each of them makes it clear that the principle goal is for Job to regain his favor, status and prosperity (Job 8:5–7; 11:14–20; 22:21–30). Far from representing disinterested righteousness, this promotes a heavily motivated righteousness. In this way, the friends can be seen as those who are advancing the case that the adversary has asserted. Job, in contrast, shows throughout that he is concerned not with restored prosperity (Job 9:21) but rather with clearing up the matter and restoring his reputation as a man who is righteous before God. He wants to contend with God because he has nothing to confess before God (Job 10:7; 13:19, 23; 23:11–12).
Additional evidence that the friends’ advice can be understood in appeasement terms is found in Job’s responses, particularly his final word to them in Job 27:1–6. He refuses to admit that they are right, and the integrity that he maintains is that he will not simply offer a blanket, blind confession with the hopes that he will appease God’s inexplicable wrath and be restored to prosperity. Had he done so in response to the friends’ advice, he would have proven that the adversary was right—that he was interested only in his benefits rather than being characterized by true, disinterested righteousness. For all of this to work effectively in the book it is important that Job himself be as ignorant of the scene in heaven as his friends are. If he knows what is truly at stake, the impact of his response would be nullified. Therefore, like his friends, he must believe that he is on trial, and he does. Whatever doubts he harbors and whatever accusations he hurls against the Almighty, as inappropriate and inaccurate as they may be, what is important for the book is that he retains the integrity of believing that righteousness is more important than reward.
2.4. The Role of Wisdom: The Interlude (Job 28).
With Job’s final refusal to follow the friends’ advice in Job 27:1–6, the friends’ role is over, as is the role of the adversary whom they represent. Job, who is the prime witness for the defense (of God’s policies) rather than the defendant (as he assumed), has demonstrated that his righteousness is truly disinterested. The answers of the friends have been rejected as superficial in that they have misrepresented God (Job 42:7–8) by suggesting that he has only to be appeased for some indiscernible and possibly irrational anger (Mattingly, 332). The adversary need not be mentioned, for he shares in this indictment because the friends were the advocates of his case. The wisdom interlude (Job 28) serves the function of indicating that even though we have heard from the best that the sages of the ancient world had to offer (for discussion of the social location of the friends, see Albertz), we have not yet heard true wisdom. It closes the dialogue section of the book with the promise that there is more to offer (Dumbrell, 92) and so points the direction toward the denouement that is to be first hinted at by the creative position forged by Elihu, then brought to fruition in the dramatic and revolutionary perspective offered in the speech of Yahweh (Geller, 174).
2.5. The Role of Job’s Discourse.
Job’s three speeches in the discourse section serve an important function as the book proceeds. The reminiscences in Job 29 indicate clearly that what he misses is not the wealth and not even the honor, though both are mentioned in passing. Instead, he focuses on his lost opportunities to do justice, showing that he continues to value righteousness above reward. It may also hint at an implication that he knows how to use power to bring about justice. If he is making such a claim, he is eventually disabused of this delusional conceit by Yahweh’s challenge. The theme of justice is continued in Job 30 as he recounts the resulting proliferation of injustice, of which he has now become a victim. The climax of Job’s discourses is found in Job 31 as he attempts to turn God’s silence, which has been serving as evidence of his guilt, to his advantage. By pronouncing his extended oath of innocence, he has challenged God in such a way that silence would vindicate him. After all, if he has sworn falsely, it is God’s obligation to strike him down. If God does not do so, that lack of response stands as Job’s exoneration.
2.6. The Role of Elihu.
The challenge represented in Job’s ostensibly pretentious oath of innocence has created tension in the book (will lightning crackle through the air in response to Job’s arrogance?). Elihu’s speeches hold the tension in suspense but likewise offer a response to it. This last, desperate resort by Job could easily be interpreted as self-righteousness, and Elihu treats it as such.
As previously suggested, Elihu could be seen as representative of Israelite thinking, suggested by his Hebrew name and his status as newcomer, if by nothing else. In this regard, his newcomer status is reflected in his devaluation of tradition and elevation of revelation (Albertz, 252). Further reason to consider him a suitable representative of Israel is that he is more protective of God’s justice than any of the other characters. In that regard, it is important to note that he does not simply rehash the arguments already presented by the other friends. He is more theologically creative as he redefines concepts to try to arrive at a practical synthesis. In fact, he could be considered one of the first true “theologians” (Ehrenberg, in Glatzer, 93–94). He expands the retribution principle so that it not only describes the remedial consequences of past actions (reward for righteousness, punishment or suffering for wickedness) but also now allows that suffering may be disciplinary and thereby preventative as it functions to restrain someone from following an unacceptable course of action. With this redefinition he is now no longer obligated to identify past sins of Job’s that would be sufficient to explain the severity of the punishment experienced in his dramatic fall. Instead, he only has to recognize the self-righteousness that Job has demonstrated, so excessive that even God’s justice is called into question to defend himself. In Elihu’s view, it is this response to suffering that provides the explanation, not only for the suffering itself but also for the extent of it. This is far more intricate and nuanced than the friends’ simple invocation of the retribution principle. It also puts Elihu in position to actually pin a specific accusation on Job that can be sustained. In this role, he may well see himself as the arbitrator that Job has been requesting throughout the book (Habel 1984). Finally, it should be noticed that Elihu does not buy into the strategy of appeasement, and so he differs from the other friends. His view is more sophisticated than the general ancient Near Eastern one represented by the other friends, but still it is tied too closely to the retribution principle.
2.7. The Nature of Theophany.
As Job’s friends failed to offer the expected comfort, Yahweh’s speeches fail to offer the expected solution. The *theophany has seemed so obtuse to some that it stands as a classic example of obfuscation—changing the subject to avoid the issue, distracting the questioner and inspiring terror all at once. This is a misunderstanding of the very real contribution that the book, through Yahweh’s speeches, makes to the discussion, for although Yahweh does not offer the expected solution, what he does offer is, in the end, more honest, more satisfying, more helpful. It is true that Yahweh’s speeches from the whirlwind neither explains Job’s suffering, defends his own justice, enters into the courtroom for the confrontation that Job requested nor responds to Job’s oath of innocence. Instead, the speeches of Yahweh suggest that the entire issue has been misdirected and there can be no right answers when the wrong questions are being asked (on the book’s message, see 3 below).
The focus of the theophany is on God’s wisdom, not his justice. The initial speech (Job 38:1–39:30) deals with God’s wisdom in maintaining order in the cosmos. The questions that identify all the things that Job is incapable of doing carry the implication that they catalogue some of what God does pertaining to roles and functions in the world. These serve as demonstrations of God’s wisdom because order is at the heart of wisdom. So, for example, Job 38:4–38 concerns cosmic geography (vv. 4–11, its delimitation; vv. 12–15, its exploitation in doing justice; vv. 16–18, its exploration; vv. 19–24, access to it; vv. 25–38, manipulation of it) and God’s maintenance of order in these realms.
At the conclusion of God’s first speech Job is ready to confess his lack of wisdom—he has no understanding of the intricate workings of the cosmos and is incapable of maintaining order. But there is more. God’s response is to issue a further challenge to Job, now concerning not Job’s understanding of the established order but rather his ability to respond to and harness threats to cosmic order. This is the topic of the second speech (Job 40:15–41:34) (based on the conclusion that Behemoth and Leviathan here are not zoological species past or present but rather cosmic creatures [Dumbrell, 94–95; Fyall associates Behemoth with Ugaritic Mot, and Leviathan with Satan]). This task is construed not as doing justice but rather as withholding the forces of disorder. Again this is testimony to God’s wisdom and power.
2.8. The Role of the Postscript.
Several important elements are addressed in the postscript. Obviously, it is not intended to tie up all the loose ends. It is worthy of notice that Job does not repent of any sin that may have been presumed to be the cause of his suffering. Instead, he repents of the accusations that he has cast against God and of his doubts concerning God (Rowley, in Glatzer, 125). This is an indication that the book is more interested in one’s view of God than in one’s understanding of the causes of suffering. Job never learns of the opening scene in the heavenly court, and he is given no explanation for his suffering. At the same time, however, he indicates that he is satisfied with the information that he does receive—enough so to renounce his self-defense and claims of God’s injustice (Clines, xxxix). Job’s friends are indicted for their flawed view of God, whereas Job’s view of God as one who responds to righteousness and does not need to be appeased is vindicated. Finally, and significantly, God restores Job’s prosperity. This does not erase the pain of the initial losses, but it makes an important statement: in the aftermath of this test of God’s policies, they remain the same. God will continue to bring prosperity to the righteous because it has been demonstrated that doing so does not inhibit the development of true righteousness.
1 J. H. Walton, “Job 1: Book Of,” ed. Tremper Longman III and Peter Enns, Dictionary of the Old Testament: Wisdom, Poetry & Writings (Downers Grove, IL; Nottingham, England: IVP Academic; Inter-Varsity Press, 2008), 336–340.
Courtroom scene:
The book has been described as one big lawsuit (TDOT 13.476), with God as plaintiff and Job as the accused, and so it may seem to the characters in the book. But as I have suggested, the author rises above this standard formula to offer the reader a different perspective with greater prospects for progress, whereby God is the accused and Job the unwitting witness for the defense.
3.1. The Indictment.
In the heavenly scene (Job 1–2) Job is charged with nothing except perhaps questionable motives. His righteousness is affirmed as a given from the beginning, and neither God nor the accuser suggests that Job’s behavior is anything short of righteous. The charges are made by the adversary and by Job against God, and it is his policies that are on trial. It would appear that God loses whichever way he goes, for there is no middle ground from which to redeem his policies.
3.2. The “Courtroom.”
The courtroom that becomes the setting for the drama is philosophical rather than physical—framed by the retribution principle. This setting juxtaposes three claims: (1) God is just; (2) Job is righteous; (3) the retribution principle is true. When the book opens, these three are givens, accepted by all as true. As the book takes shape, however, it becomes logically impossible to maintain all three claims. If we think of the courtroom as a triangle with one of these claims in each corner, we will see that each of the parties makes a choice to defend one corner (see Figure 1). From that vantage point one of the remaining two corners will be accepted, but the third must be forfeited (Tsevat).
The three friends defend the traditional affirmations represented in the retribution principle. They affirm the principle throughout their speeches in many different ways. From that defensive position they also adopt the traditional conviction that God is just. Consequently, they can only forfeit Job’s righteousness, deducing that it has been compromised, though they lack any real knowledge of offense. Given the parameters of the philosophy and the presuppositions that tradition declares, their logic is infallible.
The Triangle of Claims
Job is adamant in his insistence that he has remained as righteous as he ever was. This is not a conclusion born of deduction; rather, it represents his true self-knowledge. Sudden change of fortunes, such as he has experienced, would indicate dramatic failures that represented a significant departure from previous behavior. If his prior behavior had been rewarded, and therefore considered worthy, then there should be no change in his situation, for there has been no variation in his conduct. After he chooses which corner to defend, his vision is too limited to renounce the retribution principle, for he can imagine no viable alternative. But as he affirms its truth, he is left in the unenviable and uncomfortable position of questioning the justice of God (see Job 40:8).
The fourth friend, Elihu (Job 32–37), positions himself firmly in the corner of God’s justice. As he adopts this posture, he engages in a philosophical sleight of hand by which he can avoid discarding either the retribution principle or Job’s righteousness. As explained in the discussion of the rhetorical strategy, Elihu redefines the parameters, first expanding the retribution principle and then questioning Job’s righteousness on the basis of the revised definition. All three human parties (friends, Job, Elihu) accept the triangle as the basis for the discussion and the foundation from which answers must be found. We should also note that it is this setting that is the basis for the indictment against God, since both the accuser and Job assume that God’s policy is accurately represented by the retribution principle and on that basis they have pressed their charges.
3.3. The Trial.
Two possible responses by Job could result in God’s losing the case. The quickest response, and perhaps not contrary to human nature, would have been for Job to succumb to his wife’s advice: “Curse God and die.” If Job had fallen to that temptation, it would have indicated that only the rewards made life worth living. It would have demonstrated that righteousness did not have a central place in Job’s thinking. The second way that God could have lost the case would have been realized if Job had been persuaded by the appeals of his friends and adopted the strategy of appeasement. If Job listened to either his wife or his friends, the adversary would have been declared the victor, and it would have to be concluded that there really was no such thing as disinterested righteousness, thus calling into question the legitimacy of God’s policy of rewarding the righteous.
Answering Job’s charges against God is more complex. God would lose this part of the case if the retribution principle were allowed to stand unaltered or unnuanced, and given that foundation, he was unable to offer an explanation for the suffering of the righteous in general, and Job in particular. The book makes no attempt to offer the explanation but instead undertakes the task of reformulating the foundation.
The idea that reformulation was an option to be considered first becomes evident in the nuancing commenced by Elihu. Since Job thinks that he is on trial, he is thinking about winning, whereas since it is God’s policies that are truly on trial, Job is actually pursuing options that will mean that God loses. God loses if he attempts to explain Job’s suffering and cannot adequately do so, and this is precisely the type of explanation that Job is pressing for as he tries to force God into court or manipulate him by oath (Job 31). Of course, another way Job can win the case that he thinks he is involved in (concerning his own righteousness) is if God admits, on the basis of the retribution principle system, that he had acted unjustly and, in effect, apologizes. In this way, Job wins (the retribution principle stands and Job’s righteousness is affirmed), but he wins at a terrible cost: God loses not only the case but also his dignity. He is no longer a God worth serving. Three options are theoretically open to God: (1) give an explanation for righteous suffering, specifically Job’s (and thus uphold the retribution principle); (2) admit that Job did not deserve the suffering (and uphold the retribution principle even as he admitted his failure to enforce it); (3) dismantle the retribution principle.
3.4. The Parties and the Case for the Prosecution. These have already been identified. The adversary is one plaintiff, and his case is represented by his team of prosecutors, the three friends. Job has adopted the posture of a second plaintiff in a sort of countersuit to God’s allegedly spurious actions against him.
3.5. The Parties and the Case for the Defense. Job, believing that he was on trial, continually requested an advocate to undertake his defense. In the absence of such, he was attempting to press his case in his own defense and feeling inadequate to do so. But since he was not on trial, he needed no such defense. In the real trial, God’s defense team has no spokesman. Elihu may be viewed as assuming the role (since he champions the justice of God), but he does not understand the nature of the case. He tries to vouchsafe a victory for God by offering an explanation of Job’s suffering by means of adjusting rather than dismantling the retribution principle. Elihu is under the impression that Job is on trial, and he mounts an impressive and irrefutable (because unfalsifiable) accusation against Job, but to no avail. The retribution principle, however manipulated, is incapable of providing the answer.
When Yahweh finally speaks, he does not do so in his own defense. At that stage he has already won the first part of his case (against the adversary) on the strength of his lone witness, Job, who has refused to give up his integrity. Job has served in the role of witness even though he is one of God’s prosecutors. In God’s response (Job 38–41) the retribution principle system is shown to be simplistic and is dismantled (Dumbrell, 98; Greenberg 1995b, 329). If we go back to the triangle as representing the philosophical courtroom, we could say that God insists on a change of venue—a new setting in which the trial is to be conducted. He discards the triangle as an adequate setting for the discussion. God’s wisdom, the direction indicated in the wisdom hymn in Job 28, is a more suitable arena for the discussion of suffering than is God’s justice.
Yet it was God’s justice, or at least the justice of his policies, that presumably was under investigation. The problem is that for God’s justice in running the world to be assessed, someone must have all the information that is involved in God’s running of the world (Job 40:8–14; 41:11). God does not try to defend his justice in his discourses, because, as becomes clear, no one is in a position to assess his justice.
3.6. The Verdict.
Job demonstrated that his righteousness was not simply a pursuit of blessing and prosperity. Consequently, the adversary’s charge against God’s policy of blessing righteous people was shown to be false. God demonstrated that his wisdom surpasses the simple equations of the retribution principle, and that the operation of the cosmos is based on wisdom rather than on the premise of the retribution principle. Consequently, Job’s charge of injustice, itself premised on the retribution principle, was also shown to be false. God’s policies thus were vindicated, and he showed his renewed commitment to them by again heaping blessing on Job.
But how is this not a reiteration of the retribution principle? The difference is that in this new view the retribution principle is not of a system that is the foundation of world order and operation. It does not represent a guarantee or a mechanical cause/effect process. It is God’s delight to prosper those who are faithful to him, and it is God’s commitment to punish wickedness. That is the nature of God. But this cannot be reduced to a formula (Dumbrell, 102). God has created the natural world and maintains it day by day. But that does not mean that the natural world is endowed with the attributes of God. Rain can be used by God to enforce justice, but the rain is not just (Job 38:25–27). In this way the book refutes the idea of a moral order in the natural world (Kaufmann, in Glatzer, 66). God administers the world in wisdom, and from his sovereign wisdom justice results. We may be lacking sufficient information to be able to affirm that God’s justice is being carried out day by day. We do have enough, however, to affirm that he is wise. If we believe that he is wise, then there is good reason to believe that he is just.
If this interpretation is accurate, then the book of Job argues pointedly against the *theodicy philosophies in the ancient world and represents an Israelite modification. This modification, rather than offering a revised theodicy, seeks to reinterpret the justice of God from something that may be debated to something that is a given. In Yahweh’s speech it is not his justice that is defended, it is his wisdom.
We have already noted that Job receives no explanation concerning the cause of his suffering, and so we might infer that neither should we expect such explanations for our suffering or for anyone else’s. A focus on justice demands explanation of cause and gazes at the past, whereas a focus on wisdom needs only to understand that God in his wisdom has a purpose as it fixes one’s gaze on the future. In John 9 when the disciples raise the question about the man born blind, Jesus likewise turns their attention from cause to purpose: “Neither this man nor his parents sinned … but this happened so that the work of God might be displayed in his life.” Job’s friends had considered suffering to be punitive; Elihu had considered it disciplinary; Jesus, following the lead of the book of Job, considers it beyond explanation yet capable of being turned to spiritual profit if it leads to knowledge of God and fellowship with him. This is not a theological or intellectual solution—it is a spiritual insight (Rowley, in Glatzer, 126–28).
It is of interest to note, in conclusion, that the book of Job goes on record to affirm that there is indeed such a thing as the innocent suffering (Hartley, 47; Rowley, in Glatzer, 125), and the NT confirms that assessment. In the end, the book is less interested in why there is innocent suffering than in what is the proper way to think about God when we live in such a world. What satisfied Job in the end was not that he now understood suffering better but rather that he knew God better. As H. H. Rowley (in Glatzer, 125–26) puts it,
In his prosperity he thought that he had known God. Now he realizes that compared with his former knowledge his present knowledge is as the joy of seeing compared with a mere rumor. All his past experience of God was as nothing compared with the experience he had now found. He therefore no longer cries out to be delivered from his suffering. He rests in God even in his pain.
TDOT Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, ed. G. J. Botterweck and H. Ringgren (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974–)
NT New Testament
J. H. Walton, “Job 1: Book Of,” ed. Tremper Longman III and Peter Enns, Dictionary of the Old Testament: Wisdom, Poetry & Writings (Downers Grove, IL; Nottingham, England: IVP Academic; Inter-Varsity Press, 2008), 340–342.